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Abstract 
Although it is heartening to see wealth inequality being taken seriously, key concepts are 
often muddled, including the distinction between income and wealth, what is included in 
"wealth", and facts about wealth distributions. This chapter highlights issues that arise in 
making ideas and facts about wealth inequality precise, and employs newly-available data 
to take a fresh look at wealth and wealth inequality in a comparative perspective. The 
composition of wealth is similar across countries, with housing wealth being the key asset.  
Wealth is considerably more unequally distributed than income, and it is distinctively so in 
the United States. Extending definitions to include pension wealth however reduces 
inequality substantially. Analysis also sheds light on life-cycle patterns and the role of 
inheritance. Discussion of the joint distributions of income and wealth suggests that 
interactions between increasing top income shares and the concentration of wealth and 
income from wealth towards the top is critical. 
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   national, comparative 
 
Editorial note and acknowledgements 
The paper uses data from the Eurosystem Household Finance and Consumption survey 
distributed by the European Central Bank. We are grateful to LIS Cross-National Data 
Center in Luxembourg. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
III Working paper 9                               F. Cowell, B. Nolan, J. Olivera and P. Van Kerm 
 
4 
 
1. Introduction 
These days, discussion of wealth and inequality is everywhere. It is the stuff of political 
discussion, journalistic fascination and serious academic research. This was not always so. 
In the 20th century there was a great deal of academic and policy interest in income 
distribution and inequality: wealth only occasionally peeked through as a distinct issue.1  But 
we are now in an era when a book with the title Capital in the 21st Century can become a 
best seller and politicians of both left and right find it prudent to make reference to the 
accumulation and ownership of personal wealth. 
Unfortunately, although it is heartening to see wealth inequality being taken seriously in 
economic discussion, key concepts are often muddled, often by commentators who should 
know better. Sometimes this muddle appears in the failure to distinguish clearly between 
income and wealth. It also concerns what is to be included in “wealth”, and the muddle often 
extends to the facts about wealth distribution. 
Accordingly, the purpose of this chapter is to provide an overview of the main issues that 
arise in making important ideas and facts about wealth distribution and wealth inequality 
precise. It also covers the economics that underlie the generation of wealth distributions and 
that perpetuate inequality. Here is a brief guide to what we do. 
The Basics 
We begin with the fundamental concepts of private wealth and the problems of interpreting 
them empirically (Section 2). This means making clear what is and is not included in wealth 
statistics gathered at household level. The principal problem involved is that of valuing a wide 
range of financial and nonfinancial assets; some of these assets – such as public and private 
pension rights – raise special difficulties. It also requires careful consideration of the ways in 
which measurement of inequality presents particular difficulties in the case of wealth: this 
includes the theoretical requirement that inequality measures deal with negative as well as 
zero values and empirical circumstances such as the presence of negatives and the 
skewness and fat tails of the wealth distributions resulting in sparse, extreme data. These 
issues have important implications for modelling wealth inequality and for statistical inference. 
They also give rise to major issues concerning data quality and the problem of cross-country 
comparisons are reviewed. 
 
1
 Honourable exceptions to this neglect include Atkinson (1974), Atkinson and Harrison (1978), Miller and        
   McNamee (1977), Revell (1967) and Wolff (1955). 
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Application 
These theoretical and empirical issues are more convincingly discussed in the context of a 
specific application. To do this, we examine in Section 3 what can be learned from data now 
becoming available from specially-designed harmonised surveys carried out across 15 
European countries, initiated and organised by the European Central Bank: the Eurosystem 
Household Finance and Consumption Survey (HFCS). We use data from this source for five 
European countries (France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, Spain) and data from the 
Luxembourg Wealth Study for three more non-HFCS countries (Australia, the UK and the 
USA) to focus on the key issues of wealth distribution to take a fresh look at some of the basic 
questions about wealth and wealth inequality. We then, in Section 4, examine the size and 
composition of household net worth in these eight countries and use the techniques 
discussed in Section 2 of the chapter to compare wealth inequality and income inequality 
across countries.  
The Mechanisms that Drive Inequality 
Later in the chapter we set out the elements of the essential economic story of personal 
wealth and income. Both market and non-market mechanisms in the story of how wealth 
inequalities and long-run income inequalities develop and persist.  
This story divides naturally into two parts, each part having a distinctive account of the 
mechanisms that determine the dynamics of wealth distributions.  
The first of these two parts concerns what happens within a person’s lifetime. So in Section 
5 we examine the lessons that may be learned from the literature on life-cycle models. The 
simplest of these intra-generational models attempt to understand and replicate the 
transmission and concentration of wealth, based on the actions of rational individuals in 
financial markets. The variation in people’s wealth over their life cycle will itself contribute to 
dispersion of wealth and so it is useful to consider how much this process contributes to 
wealth inequality and income inequality. However, a substantial part of the assets 
accumulated through this process, public and private pension rights, present special 
problems when one considers including them in an aggregation of personal or household 
assets: these problems – discussed in Section 6 - are not mere technicalities, as they can 
substantially influence one’s estimates of, and interpretations of wealth inequality. 
The second part of the story concerns the connections through wealth between the 
generations: the role of bequests and inheritances. It is clear that this intergenerational 
component of the wealth-distribution process has the potential to be a major force in the 
creation of and perpetuation of wealth inequality. But the economic analysis of the 
intergenerational process presents a number of difficulties. Unlike the intra-generational story 
where the baseline model is fairly clear and founded on market activity, there is no simple 
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consensus on the appropriate way to model what is going on, and economists have to accept 
that here the role of the family is likely to be much more important than the role of the market. 
These issues are discussed in Section 7.  
Top Incomes and Wealth 
It is clear that there ought to be some connections between high wealth and high income. But 
the links are not mechanical and the relationship between these two important economic 
concepts can be complex. Income inequality and wealth inequality each deserve careful 
analysis in their own right and it would be foolish to suggest that either of them should be 
pursued to the exclusion of the other: one needs to keep an analytical eye on both. Section 
8 examines the key messages about trends in top incomes and the contrasting patterns 
across the developed countries revealed by the recent research led by Atkinson, Piketty and 
Saez based principally on data from the administration of income tax systems. It then draws 
on the comparative survey data employed in the rest of the chapter to investigate the wealth 
holdings and sources of income of those at the top of the income distribution in those surveys 
(which will in all likelihood not adequately capture the top 1%), and the extent to which their 
wealth and income sources are distinctive.  
2. Measuring wealth with survey data 
The empirical measurement of wealth is even more challenging than that of income. How 
best to assign values to assets and liabilities at a certain point of the life-cycle, the choice of 
unit of analysis and whether differences in household size are taken into account, and 
deciding which assets to include all represent significant methodological choices. Here we 
highlight some of the distinctive empirical and statistical issues arising in the measurement 
of wealth inequality using household survey data; Cowell and Van Kerm (2015) provides a 
more detailed and technical discussion of problems and potential solutions. 
Measuring household wealth 
 
Sources of data 
Several sources have historically been used to obtain information on wealth at the ‘micro’ 
level (individuals, families or households): wealth tax data, estate tax data, capitalisation 
methods based on capital income data and, of course, direct surveys. We focus on the latter. 
The main advantage of household surveys is that they allow coverage of a wide range of 
assets for representative samples of a population. They are becoming available in a growing 
number of countries. Collecting survey data on wealth is however notably more complicated 
than collecting data on income. Issues of sampling and non-sampling error are compounded 
by the nature of wealth data and its distribution. 
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Household net worth 
The most common concept used to analyse the distribution of household wealth is the current 
net worth defined as the difference between the monetary value of a household’s assets and 
its total liabilities: 
𝑤 = ∑ 𝑝𝑗𝐴𝑗𝑚𝑗=1 − 𝐷 
where 𝐴𝑗 is the amount of asset type j owned by the household, 𝑝𝑗 is its price or unit value 
and D is the household’s total outstanding debt. Empirically, this definition requires decision 
about what assets---financial and non-financial---are included, a decision which is typically 
dictated by data availability and decisions of the survey agency. In general, one will include 
among non-financial assets the value of the household’s main residence and other real estate 
property, the value of self-employment business and of additional real assets such as cars 
and jewellery. Financial assets will usually include deposits on current or savings accounts, 
mutual funds, bonds, shares and other financial assets. Financial assets also often include 
life insurance and voluntary private pension plans. (Inclusion of occupational and public 
pensions is an issue to which we return below.) On the other side of the household’s balance 
sheet, liabilities typically include home-secured debts, loans and lines of credit as well as 
informal debt. On the aggregate, the household’s main residence represents, by far, the 
largest share of household assets. 
There are two main issues with respect to this definition of net worth. The first is that it misses 
public pension entitlements (also referred to as social security wealth), which are generally 
considered to represent an important asset. One motive for wealth accumulation is to finance 
consumption in old age and it is clear that the incentives for accumulation are lower when 
people are entitled to generous pensions organised though public transfer mechanisms. 
Ideally, one would like to be able to capture the ‘wealth equivalent’ of future pension 
entitlements in a comprehensive measure of net worth which would reflect better the capacity 
of people to finance future consumption. While this is generally done with private pension 
plans, it is a difficult task for public pensions, since this requires knowledge of employment 
careers and of future state pension parameters. We return to this question in Section 7. 
The valuation of assets 
The second key issue is the valuation of assets, especially of real assets, that is the choice 
for pj in equation (1) above. These valuation choices may have a major impact on measured 
wealth inequality, including whether the market price is to be used for each asset j, or some 
type of imputed price – for example, choosing the market price, the imputed rent or the self-
reported price for housing may affect the size of wealth and its distribution. Bastagli and Hills 
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(2013) show the dramatic effect of fluctuating house prices on wealth inequality in the UK, 
while Wolff (2012) analyses how sharp changes in asset prices affected the distribution of 
wealth in the USA. In a survey context, respondents’ assessments of the current market value 
of their house may often be reasonably good, but their knowledge of the current market value 
of financial assets such as stocks and shares may be much more variable and the value of 
insurance-related long-term savings may be particularly opaque. Under-valuation by 
respondents of the value of these financial assets is likely to be one contributor to their overall 
under-representation in household surveys when compared with external aggregate figures 
(along with non-sampling and representativeness problems to be discussed shortly). There 
are even greater difficulties in assigning a market value to unincorporated businesses, which 
will be very important for the minority of households affected but to which they may have 
great difficulty assigning a value (as reflected in the often high non-response rate to that item 
in surveys by those who say they do have such a business). Distinctive problems also arise 
when one aims to incorporate pension wealth – both private and public – into the analysis, 
as will be discussed below. 
The unit of analysis 
It is standard practice in analyzing inequality in the distribution of income to take the 
household as the recipient unit but convert total household income into “single-adult 
equivalent income” and analyse the distribution of that equivalent income across individuals. 
This is intended to take economies of scale in household spending and the lower needs of 
children versus adults into account when evaluating the living standard attained with a given 
income level and household size. By contrast, application of equivalence scales to household 
wealth data is more controversial (Bover 2010, Jäntti et al. 2013, OECD 2013, Sierminska 
and Smeeding 2005). This reflects the fact that the conceptual and empirical issues arising 
in the case of wealth are distinctive. For example, if wealth is interpreted as the value of 
potential future consumption (say after retirement), it is not current household composition 
that should matter, but future composition. Taking a different tack, if one is interested in 
wealth as an indication of status or power, there is little reason to adjust wealth for household 
size at all. Furthermore, one might be interested in the wealth held by each individual within 
the household rather than their holdings in aggregate – particularly from a gender perspective, 
for example – but the information required to do so satisfactorily may not be available. 
Practice therefore varies in empirical work and choices can legitimately differ according to 
the purpose of the analysis. Here, largely for convenience, we take the household as unit of 
analysis and analyze the wealth (and income) distribution across households rather than 
individuals, without any account being taken of differences in household size and composition. 
Non-sampling error and representativity of wealth surveys 
Survey data is subject to both sampling and non-sampling errors, and when sampling from a 
highly skewed distribution like that of wealth, most samples will underestimate inequality and 
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the length of the upper tail. This can be addressed by over-sampling the upper tail, although 
the information required to provide a sampling frame allowing that to be done satisfactorily is 
not always available. Non-sampling errors take the form of differential unit non-response and 
misreporting of asset (or debt) amounts. Misreporting commonly takes the form of under-
reporting or item non-response – the response rate on wealth items may be particularly high 
for the wealthy. Re-weighting to improve the representativeness of the sample will be of some 
help, especially if a high-wealth sampling frame has been used, since respondents from the 
main and special high-wealth samples can be separately weighted; however, as Davies 
(2009) points out, a perfect fix for differential response is not available. He also notes that 
under-reporting and item non-response vary by asset or debt type, appearing to be most 
severe for financial assets notably stocks and bonds, whereas house values show little bias 
and mortgage debt is on average only moderately under-reported. Non-sampling errors may 
be growing more severe because both unit and item response rates are declining in 
household surveys generally.  
 
International survey data on household wealth 
The Eurosystem Household Finance and Consumption survey 
The Eurosystem Household Finance and Consumption survey (HFCS) has been initiated and 
coordinated by the European Central Bank. Two waves of HFCS data have been collected 
to date. At the time of writing however, data from the first wave only, collected in late 2010 or 
early 2011 in 15 Eurozone countries, are available.  
The HFCS provides comparable data across all Eurosystem countries. The collection is 
based on an ex ante harmonised approach: centrally coordinated definitions of core target 
variables were adopted, a harmonized questionnaire template was designed, and all 
countries coordinated sampling design and processing. The survey was designed on the 
model of the US Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF), which is generally considered to be 
the 'gold standard' for household surveys on wealth. In particular, various SCF procedures 
were adopted regarding (multiple) imputation of missing data, over-sampling of wealthy 
households, the provision of bootstrap replication weights, and the design of the 
questionnaire. See European Central Bank (2013) and HFCS (2014) for details. 
The Luxembourg Wealth Study (LWS)  
The Luxembourg Wealth Study (LWS) is a large-scale project of ex post harmonisation of 
household survey data on wealth from thirteen countries. It is a sibling of the well-established 
Luxembourg Income Study known for providing harmonized data on household incomes 
across 48 countries since the early 1980s. The LWS database focuses on wealth and debt 
of households and “the goal of LWS is to enhance studies on understanding of households' 
financial stability through both the analysis of wealth distribution and other related dimensions 
  
III Working paper 9                               F. Cowell, B. Nolan, J. Olivera and P. Van Kerm 
 
10 
 
on economic well-being” (LIS Cross-National Data Center, 2016, p.1). The data files contain 
variables constructed from a set of independent surveys collected in different countries. The 
LWS team has defined a template of variables about household assets, debt and income and 
data from national surveys are manipulated and recoded to fill the LWS template variables 
and adhere as closely as possible to the LWS definitions. See Sierminska et al. (2006) for 
details. 
After the release of a first pilot database in 2007, a new version of LWS has been available 
since 2016. The new release contains more countries and years – including data sets 
originally collected through the HFCS for a few countries. It is therefore now easy to use 
consistent definitions of wealth variables for combined analysis of data from the HFCS and 
from LWS for non-Eurozone countries. 
3. Evidence on household wealth in eight countries 
We now take advantage of data available in the HFCS and LWS to provide fresh empirical 
evidence about the size and distribution of household wealth in eight developed countries. 
We focus our empirics on eight countries covering a range of economic environments as well 
as institutional and cultural backgrounds: Germany, France, Italy, Luxembourg, Spain (from 
HFCS) and Australia, the United Kingdom and the United States of America (from LWS). The 
underlying surveys for the LWS countries are the Wealth and Assets Survey collected in 
Britain by the Office for National Statistics (2010-12), the Survey of Consumer Finance 2010 
by the US Federal Reserve and the Survey of Income and Housing (2009-10) by the 
Australian Bureau of Statistics.  
The size of net wealth 
Table 1 displays the level of net worth in the eight countries examined. The first column 
provides values for average net worth expressed in euros.2 To help appreciate the size of net 
worth compared to household income, all subsequent columns express net worth in terms of 
average annual gross household income. We believe this alternative metric is useful for 
comparing the importance of net worth in the different countries, and we use it throughout the 
chapter. 
If we except Luxembourg, and Australia to a lesser extent, cross-country differences in 
average net worth are not very large, from just under 200,000 euros in Germany to 290,000 
in Spain and the UK, up to 350,000 in the United States. Cross-country variations are further 
 
2
 For non eurozone countries, original values were converted from national currency values at the September 
average exchange rate of the year of survey, namely 0.72 EUR/AUD, 0.75 EUR/USD and 1.15 EUR/GBP. 
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muted when average net worth is expressed in years of average household income, from a 
low 4.5 years in Germany, between 6 and 7 years in France, Australia, the UK and the USA,   
about 8 years in Italy and Luxembourg and up to 9.3 in Spain.  
Average net worth statistics are essential to inform us of the 'size of the cake' but, as is well 
known, the distribution of net worth tends to be very skewed and concentrated among the 
richest households, so it is useful to examine differences in median net worth and other 
quantiles. Cross-country differences appear to be much larger if we consider median net 
worth. The US now has the lowest value at just under 1 year worth of average annual income, 
a value close to Germany. This is more than five times less that the median net worth in 
Luxembourg (4.8), Italy (5) or Spain (5.8). Cross-country differences are of similar orders of 
magnitude if we look at the other two quartiles (the 25th and 75th percentiles) shown in Table 
1, again showing the comparatively low values in the United States. These figures provide a 
first indication that, although the aggregate levels of net worth are not hugely different in the 
countries considered here, their distribution across households appear to be remarkably 
different. As a matter of curiosity at this stage, it is interesting to point out the similarity of 
values between the United Kingdom and France (and perhaps Australia to a lesser extent) 
and between Luxembourg and Italy, once net worth is expressed in terms of years of gross 
household income.   
The last column of Table 1 shows the fraction of households having zero or negative net 
worth (when total asset values are less than liabilities). These shares are relatively low and 
comparable across countries, with notable exceptions perhaps of Germany (9%) and United 
States (14%). Although these shares are small, they are sufficiently common to be a practical 
source of concern for the calculation of net worth inequality measures, as we discuss below.  
     Table 1. The level of net worth 
 Mean 1st 
quartile 
Median 3rd 
quartile 
Share 
<=0 
 (In euros) (In average annual income)  
Germany 195,170 4.5 0.2 1.2 4.8 0.09 
Italy 275,205 8.0 1.0 5.1 9.4 0.03 
Luxembourg 710,092 8.5 0.7 4.8 8.8 0.04 
Spain 291,352 9.3 2.5 5.8 10.6 0.04 
France 233,399 6.3 0.3 3.1 7.6 0.04 
Australia 434,952 6.8 1.1 4.2 7.7 0.02 
United Kingdom 290,285 6.0 0.8 3.5 7.2 0.03 
United States 348,835 6.4 0.1 0.9 3.8 0.14 
Notes: Values in euros are converted at the September average exchange rate of the 
year of survey, namely 0.72 EUR/AUD, 0.75 EUR/USD and 1.15 EUR/GBP. Values 
expressed in average annual income have been divided by the mean annual gross 
total household income in the respective country (as reported in the survey). 
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The composition of household wealth 
It has been well documented that the lion's share of total assets are in the form of real assets, 
and in particular in the value of owner-occupied household's main residence (see, e.g., 
Sierminska et al., 2006, Cowell & Van Kerm, 2015). Figure 1 depicts the composition of net 
worth in the eight countries examined here. In each panel, the unit length bar at the top 
represents total household assets. The white segment on this bar shows how much total 
assets are to be reduced by debts to give net worth. The following four shorter segments 
show the composition of total assets across four broad asset types: financial assets first (in 
light grey) and then three real asset types (in dark grey) - the value of household's main 
owner-occupied residence, the value of self-employment businesses and the value of other 
real assets (such as other real estate, cars, jewellery, etc.). (The actual values of net worth, 
debt and each components expressed in years of average household income are shown on 
the segments.)             
Figure 1 shows that, in the aggregate, the level of debts represent a relatively small fraction 
of total assets, in the range of 5-15 percent. This is in line with estimates provided, e.g., in 
Davies (2009). The largest incidence of debt relative to the size of total assets is observed in 
the USA, Australia and the United Kingdom. It is somewhat lower in the Eurozone countries, 
especially in Italy. On the other side of the balance sheet, the importance of real assets -
housing wealth in particular – over financial assets is clear. On average, households own 
about one year’s worth of average income in financial assets in almost all countries. The USA 
is again an exception with financial holdings of a value up to 3 years’ worth of average income. 
Households' main residence is on average worth between just above two years of income (in 
Germany or the USA) and above five years of income (in Spain and Italy). Variations in the 
value of housing relative to income not only informs us of the composition of household asset 
portfolio, but it is also a direct indication of the cost of acquisition of housing for non-owners. 
The high value-to-income ratios observed in Spain, Italy or Luxembourg suggest that housing 
acquisition through inheritance may play a bigger role than elsewhere in this context. We 
return to the role of inheritance below. 
Figure 1. The composition of average net worth: real assets, financial assets and debt 
(a) Germany  (b) Italy 
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(c) Luxembourg  (d) Spain 
 
 
 
(e) France  (f) Australia 
 
 
 
(g) United Kingdom  (h) United States 
 
 
 
Figure 1 reveals the composition of overall assets in the population. There is obviously a lot 
of heterogeneity in specific households' portfolio. Specifically there is interest in examining 
how the composition of net worth for the wealthiest differs from the average just discussed. 
It is often argued that the wealthy are able to accumulate assets yielding higher returns and 
thereby consolidate their advantage. Figure 2 shows the asset composition of the 
wealthiest 5% in our samples. Whether the surveys adequately represent the richest 5% in 
the population is unlikely, given the difficulties in capturing this segment in surveys as 
discussed above. Our notion of 'richest 5%' should therefore be interpreted with care, but 
we believe that comparing the wealthiest in our samples to the rest of the population 
remains an interesting contrast. 
Figure 2 is in all respects designed like Figure 1. One should however first note of course the 
different levels of net worth: the average net worth of the wealthiest 5% ranges from just 
above 40 years of annual income in Germany and the United Kingdom, up to 80 years of 
annual income in the USA!  
Unsurprisingly, debts bite a much smaller chunk of total assets than in the overall population, 
although they remain non-negligible (and higher in absolute value than in the average 
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population). The share of financial assets is not much bigger than in the rest of the population 
but there is a reallocation of the composition of real assets towards self-employment business 
and, more importantly, towards 'other real assets' (which notably includes real estate other 
than one's own residence). So, overall, while the level of net worth is much higher for the top 
5%, its composition does not appear to differ a lot from the rest of the population. 
 
 
Figure 2. The composition of net worth among the wealthy: real assets, 
financial assets and debt in the top 5% of the net worth distribution 
(a) Germany (b) Italy 
 
 
(c) Luxembourg (d) Spain 
  
(e) France (f) Australia 
  
(g) United Kingdom (h) United States 
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4. Evidence on wealth vs. income inequality  
As is well-known, wealth is much more unequally distributed than income.  
Figure 3 displays Lorenz curves and Gini coefficients for gross household income, total 
assets and net worth. The Lorenz curve plots cumulative wealth (or income) shares against 
cumulative population shares. The further apart the Lorenz curve is from the main diagonal 
the more unequally distributed is wealth, that is, the smaller is the share of wealth held by 
poor households relative to the share held by rich households. Notice how the Lorenz curve 
for net worth briefly cumulates below zero since households with the lowest net worth actually 
have negative net worth (their liabilities exceed the value of their assets). The Gini coefficient 
is defined as (twice) the area between the 45 degree line and the Lorenz curve. It summarizes 
the degree of inequality in the distribution of wealth and is a most popular measure of 
inequality. The Gini coefficient is prominent among the many alternative measures of 
inequality in the context of wealth analysis because it remains appropriately defined in the 
presence of negative values, unlike many other measures based on logarithmic or fractional 
power transformations of the data (e.g., the Theil index, the mean log deviation, Atkinson 
inequality measures). See Cowell & Van Kerm (2015) for further discussion. The implication 
of the presence of negative data for the Gini index is that the index is not bounded above at 
1, but can take any positive value; notionally, there is no theoretical maximum for inequality 
when poor households can borrow infinitely to finance regressive transfers to rich households.             
It has become popular to examine top wealth or income shares. These can naturally be 
read off the Lorenz curve directly: this is equivalent to reading the Lorenz curve from the 
top-right corner down instead of from the bottom-left corner up. Top shares can also be 
connected to Gini coefficients (G) quite easily: (1+G)/2 gives the average wealth share of 
the richest 100p percent, for a randomly chosen p.  
The much larger inequality in wealth than in income is clear from Figure 2: Lorenz curves for 
wealth are further away from the 45 degree line and their Gini coefficients are larger. This 
holds even though we look at inequality in gross income (direct taxes further reduce 
inequality). The degree to which wealth is more unequally distributed however varies across 
countries. The difference is smallest in Australia, Spain or the UK (where the Gini of net worth 
is still around 19 points larger than the Gini of income) and it is largest in Germany, Spain or 
France (where the net worth Gini is about 30 points larger than the income Gini). 
Countries also differ remarkably in terms of the level of inequality: from the lowest net worth 
Gini of 0.580 in Spain to the highest of 0.758 in Germany and 0.852 in the United States. 
These cross-country variations are bigger than those observed for income inequality which 
range between 0.384 (in France) and 0.440 (in the UK) or 0.548 (in the USA).  
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Reassuringly, we note that our Gini coefficient estimates are very close to those reported in 
Sierminska et al. (2006) for the three countries examined in both our work and theirs, namely 
Germany, Italy and the United States. This is remarkable since the data cover different years 
(2001/2002 vs. 2011) and the underlying data are completely different surveys for Germany 
and Italy.  
We believe it fair to claim that Gini coefficients for net worth are large, especially in the USA. 
Using the formula mentioned above, a Gini of 0.852 means that on average the share of total 
net worth held by the richest p percent for any random p is 92 percent! (In a perfectly equal 
distribution, this average would be 50 percent.) Even for the lower, Spanish value of 0.580, 
the corresponding share would be 79 percent.  
We have not yet discussed the difference between the Lorenz curves for total assets and for 
net worth. The difference between these curves gives us indication of how much liabilities 
reduce or exacerbate inequality of assets. In all countries, inequality of net worth is higher 
than inequality of assets. This means that deducting liabilities from household assets further 
exacerbates inequality: the burden of debts is disproportionately carried by households with 
lower assets too. It is again in the USA that this effect is the strongest while it is hardly 
noticeable in Italy, Germany or France.   
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Figure 3. Lorenz curves and Gini coefficients for gross household income, total assets and net worth 
 
(a) Germany (b) Italy (c) Luxembourg (d) Spain 
    
(e) France (f) Australia (e) United Kingdom (f) United States 
    
  
Source: Calculations from HFCS and LWS 
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Popular debates tend to emphasize the gap between “the top” and “the bottom rest”. How 
much does the distance between the wealthiest and the rest of the population drive overall 
inequality? Inequality is not just a matter of differences between two homogeneous groups 
of “wealthy” and “poor” households; there is much heterogeneity in wealth levels across many 
different the segments of the population. One way to quantify this is to use a decomposability 
property of the Gini coefficient. Given a partition of the population into two groups – the top p 
percent and the bottom (100-p) percent – we can express the Gini coefficient as  
 G= p*mt*Gt + (1-p)*mb*Gb + GB  
where mt (resp. mb) is mean wealth among the wealthy top (resp. the “bottom”) divided by 
overall mean wealth, Gt is the Gini coefficient of wealth within the top p percent, Gb is the 
Gini coefficient within the bottom 100-p percent and GB is the 'between-group' Gini coefficient. 
So we can examine how much of the overall Gini coefficient can be attributed to inequality 
within the groups and how much can be attributed to inequality between the groups. Inequality 
between groups is one that would be observed if all people in the groups received the average 
wealth of their group.       
Table 2 shows decomposition components for a partition into the richest 5% and the bottom 
95%. The first four columns report Gini coefficients (overall, within bottom, within top and 
between group) while the last four show contributions of each component divided by overall 
Gini. Clearly overall inequality is not just a matter of inequality between groups. There is more 
inequality within the bottom 95% (see column (2)) than between the two groups (column (4)).  
 
Table 2. Decomposition of Gini coefficients of net worth by groups: the bottom 
95% versus the top 5% 
 Gini coefficients Contributions  
 All Within 
bottom 
95% 
Within 
top 
5% 
Between All Within 
bottom 
95% 
Within 
top 
5% 
Between 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)=(6)+(7)+(8) (6) (7) (8) 
Germany 0.758 0.661 0.442 0.406 100 45 1 54 
Italy 0.609 0.516 0.334 0.271 100 55 1 44 
Luxembourg 0.661 0.531 0.436 0.349 100 46 1 53 
Spain 0.580 0.480 0.374 0.259 100 54 1 45 
France 0.679 0.591 0.386 0.315 100 53 1 46 
Australia 0.611 0.500 0.386 0.291 100 51 1 48 
United 
Kingdom 
0.626 0.529 0.396 0.286 100 53 1 46 
United 
States 
0.852 0.742 0.486 0.565 100 32 2 66 
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Also inequality within the top 5% is substantial. Inequality within the bottom 95% accounts 
for between 45 and 55 percent of overall inequality while inequality between groups 
accounts for between 44 and 54 percent. The outlier is the US where between group 
inequality's share goes up to 66 percent (for only 32 percent attributed to inequality within 
the bottom 95%). Inequality within the top 5% only accounts for a very small share of overall 
Gini – this is largely due to the relatively small inequality within that group and, especially, to 
the small population size of this group.   
5. Accumulation over the life-cycle: age profiles in wealth holdings 
The sheer nature of wealth accumulation makes it important to examine the age profile of net 
worth. At least in part, households accumulate assets during their working life to provide 
income security and finance consumption in old age. This is the prediction of life cycle 
accumulation models. One may be tempted to argue that overall wealth inequality is not 
particularly relevant but that one should instead examine wealth inequality within cohorts for 
people at the same stage of their lives (Paglin, 1975; Almas & Mogstad, 2012). 
The underlying story is straightforward. Figure 4 illustrates a highly simplified version of the 
person’s economic life. He or she is “born” economically at time t0, on entry into the world of 
work; earnings follow a rising path until time tR, retirement, after which there may be a small 
amount of earnings from doing casual jobs: this is the broken line e(t). Imagine that 
consumption c(t) is broken down into expenditure on needs cN(t) and discretionary 
expenditure cD(t), that is largely determined by tastes (we do not need a precise, scientific 
definition of the boundary between the two components). We can imagine that cN(t) starts out 
modestly, jumps upwards at tF when a family is formed and falls again at tE, when the nest is 
empty again. Everything stops at tD, death. Of course one can put additional bends and kinks 
into both lines, but the sketch is enough to interpret what is going on in the basic dynamics 
of the life cycle. 
Figure 4. The life cycle: a stylised picture 
 
 
 
 
At any moment t in the lifetime net worth w(t) is accumulating/decumulating according to the 
following equation: 
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d𝑤(𝑡)d𝑡 = 𝑦(𝑡) − 𝑐(𝑡), 
where y(t) is total income and c(t) is consumption expenditure. We have income defined as 𝑦(𝑡) = 𝑟 𝑤(𝑡) + 𝑒(𝑡) + 𝑧(𝑡), 
where r is the interest rate on net worth (for simplicity we are assuming that it is the same in 
cases where w(t) is positive and where the person is in debt so that w(t) is negative, e(t) is 
earnings and z(t) is any form of transfer income. We have consumption defined as  𝑐(𝑡) = 𝑐N(𝑡) +  𝑐D(𝑡) 
Obviously the exact path that w(t) follows from t0 to tD depends on the initial conditions at t0, 
wealth inherited from the past. But if w(t0)=0, and if the person tries to plan cD(t) so that 
consumption is fairly smooth over the life cycle we can imagine that w(t) might start rising at 
first, then go substantially negative (mortgage on the house and so on), gradually recover 
and become positive again as the person heads in the direction of tR; after retirement w(t) 
might be expected to decumulate, but probably might not go back to zero.3 Let us see how 
this works out in practice.  
Figures 5 and 6 display average and median household net worth by age of the household 
head. Again, we express net worth in units of average annual income in each country.4 
As is expected, wealth displays a hump shape when plotted against age. Of course, because 
we use a single cross-section of the population, the age profiles that we show here may 
possibly reflect a generational pattern (a cohort effect) or a genuine household-level life-cycle 
accumulation process. But the similarity of age profiles across countries is worth pointing out: 
it is interesting to stress that a hump shape predicted by basic life-cycle models is observed 
 
3
 Obviously this elementary intragenerational story will be affected by events that are essentially 
intergenerational: inheritances that bump w(t) upwards  and planned bequests that bump w(t) downwards. 
These events may occur at any time between t0 andtD. We discuss the intergenerational part of the story in 
section 7. 
4
 Technically, estimates are obtained by local smoothing techniques: to calculate statistics “at age A” we first 
reweight all households in our sample according to the distance between the age of the household head and 
target age A. A familiar, bell-shaped, Epanechnikov kernel weighting function with bandwidth of 3.75 years is 
used in all countries---this means that only households whose head is +-/- 8 years age older/younger than age 
A are used for calculations, and the further apart from A, the smaller the household weight. Average and 
median net worth, as well as ‘conditional’ Gini coefficients were then calculated using ‘age-reweighted’ 
household for a range of values of A between 25 and 85. 
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in all eight countries. Peaks in average or median net worth are observed at 60 or 65 years 
of age, with only very few exceptions.  
The steepness of the ‘accumulation phase’ of the age profile varies somewhat across 
countries, with Australia and Luxembourg seemingly exhibiting the fastest growth of average 
and median net worth between the ages of 25 and 65 (or 55 in Australia). The growth is also 
fast in the United States if we examine average net worth, but it disappears completely if one 
examines median net worth which grows at a slow, but continuous pace. There is also some 
cross-country variation in the ‘decumulation phase’ after 60-65: in most countries, average 
net worth at age 80 is about the same as at age 40-45. Notable exceptions are Australia and 
the United States that display a much slower decline in net worth – both in the average or the 
median.   
Systematic variations in average net worth by age are indicative of “between (age) group 
inequality”. Countries with steep accumulation and decumulation profiles, such as 
Luxembourg and possibly Spain or Italy, can plausibly be seen as displaying the largest 
between group inequality, but such inequality may well be interpreted as ‘legitimate’ to the 
extent that it reflects household accumulation and decumulation patterns. 
To capture inequality that is not driven by age profiles in wealth accumulation, Figure 7 shows 
within group Gini coefficients by age, that is Gini coefficients calculated on the ‘age 
reweighted households’. In general inequality tends to decline with age: inequality among 
households younger than 35-40 tends to be higher than overall, unconditional inequality, 
sometimes largely so. However the profile differ across countries for older ages: it keeps 
declining in most countries (notably in the UK or the US) but it may also flatten out (in Spain 
or France) or even increase in very old age. Peak to trough differences in Gini coefficients 
approximately range from .2 to .3 ‘Gini points’.  
In the previous section we contrasted the net worth of the top 5% percent and of the bottom 
95%. Figure 8 shows where the top 5% are distributed by age groups: it plots the probability 
to be in the top 5% by age of household head. The hump shape observed in average net 
worth is clear here again. The similarity of this plot across countries is again striking. The 
peak is achieved at age 60-65 in all countries.  
Figure 8 also shows the probability to be in the top 5% of income distribution. This probability 
is also hump shaped but with a peak at earlier ages at around 50. With the exception of 
France, older households have a very low probability to be in the top 5% of the income 
distribution. On the contrary, they are largely over-represented in the top 5% of the net worth 
distribution in all countries (except in Germany or Spain). At the other end of the age range, 
households whose head is younger than 35 are under-represented in both the top of income 
and of the net worth distribution. Such shapes make it plain to see how policies about top 
marginal tax rates on income and wealth affect (or would affect) different populations. 
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Figure 5. Average net worth by age of household head 
(a) Germany (b) Italy (c) Luxembourg (d) Spain 
 
 
  
(e) France (f) Australia (e) United Kingdom (f) United States 
    
Note: Estimates obtained by kernel smoothing. The horizontal line gives the population average. 
Source: Calculations from HFCS and LWS 
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Figure 6. Median net worth by age of household head 
 
(a) Germany (b) Italy (c) Luxembourg (d) Spain 
 
 
  
(e) France (f) Australia (e) United Kingdom (f) United States 
    
Figure 5. Median net worth by age of household head 
Note: Estimates obtained by kernel smoothing. The horizontal line gives the population median. 
Source: Calculations from HFCS and LWS 
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Figure 7. Within cohort Gini coefficient 
 
(a) Germany (b) Italy (c) Luxembourg (d) Spain 
 
 
  
(e) France (f) Australia (e) United Kingdom (f) United States 
    
Note: Estimates obtained by kernel smoothing. The horizontal line gives the population Gini coefficient. 
Source: Calculations from HFCS and LWS 
 
 
 
.
3
.
4
.
5
.
6
.
7
.
8
.
9
1
1.
1
20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90
Age of household head
.
3
.
4
.
5
.
6
.
7
.
8
.
9
1
1.
1
20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90
Age of household head
.
3
.
4
.
5
.
6
.
7
.
8
.
9
1
1.
1
20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90
Age of household head
.
3
.
4
.
5
.
6
.
7
.
8
.
9
1
1.
1
20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90
Age of household head
.
3
.
4
.
5
.
6
.
7
.
8
.
9
1
1.
1
20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90
Age of household head
.
3
.
4
.
5
.
6
.
7
.
8
.
9
1
1.
1
20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90
Age of household head
.
3
.
4
.
5
.
6
.
7
.
8
.
9
1
1.
1
20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90
Age of household head
.
3
.
4
.
5
.
6
.
7
.
8
.
9
1
1.
1
20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90
Age of household head
  
III Working paper 9                               F. Cowell, B. Nolan, J. Olivera and P. Van Kerm 
 
25 
 
 
Figure 8. Share of households belonging to the richest 5% of the overall income or net worth distribution by age of 
household head 
 
(a) Germany (b) Italy (c) Luxembourg (d) Spain 
 
 
  
(e) France (f) Australia (e) United Kingdom (f) United States 
    
Note: Estimates obtained by kernel smoothing. 
Source: Calculations from HFCS and LWS 
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6. Pension wealth and inequality 
Standard measures of household wealth only include marketable wealth, i.e. the value of 
actual holdings such as savings, bonds, housing and loans, and sometimes the value of 
private pension balances. The expected income from pensions is generally unaccounted. 
However, this practice can mislead the analysis of wealth distribution because of the well-
known crowding-out effects of public transfers on private wealth. Feldstein (1974) was one of 
the first authors to document the extension of the crowding-out effects and estimated that 
social security wealth reduces personal saving by 30%-50% in the U.S. Although these 
effects have been contested or confirmed in later studies, it is generally accepted that pension 
wealth reduces private savings. Recent evidence from the Survey of Health, Ageing and 
Retirement in Europe (SHARE) shows that pension wealth has a displacement effect of 17%-
31% on household savings for the individuals aged 60 and more (Alessie et al. 2013).  
Given that the levels of wealth observed today have been affected by the accumulation of 
social security contributions, it seems reasonable to include pension wealth in the measures 
of household wealth. This addition will, certainly, have consequences on the measurement 
of the distribution of wealth. In one of the first papers dealing with social security wealth 
inequality, Feldstein (1976) found that the Gini index of net wealth was 0.72, while the Gini 
index of augmented wealth (adding social security wealth) was 0.51. It is also important to 
consider public and private pensions in the computation of pension wealth. In this respect, 
public pensions are mostly Defined Benefit (DB), while occupational pension plans offer 
Defined Contribution (DC) pensions which can be publicly and/or privately managed. The 
former type of pensions are generally more equally distributed than the latter. Wolff (2015) 
illustrates this with US data of 2010 for the 47-64 years old households by showing that the 
Gini index of net wealth falls from 0.83 to 0.80 after private pension wealth is added, and it is 
further reduced to 0.66 with the inclusion of public (Social Security) pension wealth. 
The relative size of pension wealth with respect to total wealth in the household can be 
considerable. For example, Frick and Grabka (2013) show that pension wealth amounts to 
57% of the wealth of German retirees, while the rest is mostly composed of housing wealth. 
The contribution of pension wealth also differs considerably along the distribution of wealth. 
For the total population, these authors find that within the fourth and fifth decile of the 
distribution of wealth, the participation of pension wealth is 95% and 87%, respectively; while 
this is 42% and 21% within the ninth and tenth decile, respectively. A recent study by 
Crawford and Hood (2016), employing a sample of retirees aged 65-79 from the English 
Longitudinal Study of Ageing (ELSA), shows that both private and public pensions are very 
important in the augmented measure of household wealth and in its distribution. From 
Crawford and Hood (2016)’s Table 1 it is possible to infer that private and public pension 
wealth represent about 19% and 22%, respectively, of an augmented measure of household 
wealth that includes both types of pensions. The equalization effects of pension wealth are 
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also important. The Gini index of household wealth falls from 0.524 to 0.489 after private 
pensions are included, and this is further reduced to 0.382 with the inclusion of public 
pensions. 
The ideal database to compute pension wealth and its contribution to wealth inequality is one 
that includes social security administrative records and household wealth holdings. Such 
databases are scarce, and hence studies must rely on household surveys inquiring for wealth 
holdings and employ alternative methods to compute pension wealth. For the retirees, the 
computation of pension wealth is much less complex because the benefit is reported by the 
individual. In the case of workers, some studies have employed various forms of statistical 
matching between survey information and social security data (Frick and Grabka 2013; 
Engelhardt and Kumar 2011), self-reported social security information (Wolff 2007), and self-
reported retrospective and subjective information (Alessie et al. 2013).   
Studies such as the ones by Frick and Grabka (2013), Wolff (2007) and Banks et al. (2005) 
define pension wealth as the present value of expected pension streams, which involves the 
use of discount rates and survival probabilities. Generally, the official life tables of the country 
are used to compute individual survival probabilities disaggregated by sex. However, other 
alternatives include the estimation of individual subjective survival rates (Gan et al. 2015, 
Bissonnette et al. 2014, Peracchi and Perotti 2014) which facilitate the simulation of life-cycle 
models, and the estimation of life tables by socio-economic status such as in Brown et al. 
(2002). 
In this section, we explore the distributional effects of including public and private pension 
wealth in an augmented measure of household wealth in 13 European countries participating 
in the first and available round (circa 2010) of the Household, Finance and Consumption 
Survey (HCFS)5. In order to simplify the computation of pension wealth and reduce the abuse 
of ad-hoc assumptions, the analysis is focused on elderly households. In this way, all 
households will be in the same section of the life-cycle, so that the inequality measures will 
be less affected by life-cycle effects. In particular, we restrict the analysis to all households 
whose reference person is aged 65-84 and the spouses are younger than 85. This is done 
because the age is top coded at 85 in HFCS. Individual survival probabilities are country, age 
and sex specific and are drawn from Eurostat’s life tables6. We assume that future pensions 
keep their real value, i.e. future increases in pensions and inflation are balanced out. Similar 
to Frick and Grabka (2013) and Crawford and Hood (2016) the discount rate is assumed to 
be 2%, but instead of simply employing the expected life expectancy as the horizon to receive 
pensions, we compute ‘annuity prices’ for each individual and multiply it by the corresponding 
 
5 
  Malta is left out of the analysis due to unavailability of the specific age of the individuals (only age groups), 
while Cyprus is discarded because the variable sex has many missing points. 
6
  Because the last age with survivors’ information for these tables is 85, we had to estimate the number of 
survivors from age 86 to 110 with Gompertz equations for each country and sex. 
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pension. It is also assumed that surviving spouses receive 50% of the partner’s pension. The 
computation of pension wealth employs the following formula: 𝐴𝑧 = ∑ 𝑝𝑧,𝑧+𝑡(1+𝑟)𝑡𝑀−𝑧𝑡=0                             (1) 
𝐴𝑧,𝑦 = 𝐴𝑧 + 𝜃 ∑ 𝑞𝑦,𝑦+𝑡(1−𝑝𝑧,𝑧+𝑡)(1+𝑟)𝑡𝑀−𝑦𝑡=0               (2) 𝑊𝑧 = 𝐴𝑧,𝑦𝑃                                                         (3) 
 
Table 3. Gini indices and means of household wealth (Euros, circa 2010) 
Country 
sample   net worth   including public pension wealth   
including public & 
private pension 
wealth 
  
diff in 
Gini (1 
- 3) 
n N   mean Gini (1)   mean 
Gini 
(2)   mean Gini (3)    
AT 524 794,743   238,141 0.696   604,245 0.450   651,690 0.485   0.211 
BE 620 1,062,455   477,203 0.559   782,970 0.411   787,675 0.412   0.147 
DE 1,022 9,860,230   210,224 0.681   516,755 0.430   540,263 0.436   0.245 
ES 2,242 4,170,933   300,627 0.554   443,503 0.481   443,503 0.481   0.073 
FI 1,887 524,541   199,119 0.516   228,812 0.453   548,247 0.379   0.138 
FR 4,169 6,271,336   287,467 0.626   632,385 0.432   633,723 0.432   0.194 
GR 546 911,786   124,338 0.507   300,943 0.361   301,860 0.359   0.148 
IT 2,592 6,914,360   292,248 0.581   567,111 0.431   574,544 0.435   0.146 
LU 159 36,472   1,067,059 0.564   1,686,588 0.450   1,714,426 0.448   0.116 
NL 381 1,653,892   237,626 0.561   425,977 0.358   676,730 0.357   0.204 
PT 1,406 1,101,183  154,443 0.656   294,621 0.509   297,802 0.511   0.145 
SI 79 169,154   101,549 0.484   190,796 0.424   197,207 0.408   0.076 
SK 181 357,333   71,099 0.379   140,693 0.258   141,771 0.261   0.118 
Source: first round of HFCS (circa 2010) and Life tables from Eurostat year 2010. 
The annuity price 𝐴𝑧  is the necessary amount of capital, in present value, to finance a 
monetary unit of life pension for a single person at age z. 𝑝𝑧,𝑧+𝑡 is the probability of survival 
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from age z to z + t according to official life tables; M is the maximum survival age (assumed 
to be 110); r is the discount rate; y is the age of the pensioner’s spouse and 𝑞𝑦,𝑦+𝑡 represents 
the probability of survival from age y to y + t. The fraction 𝜃 indicates the percentage of 
pension that a spouse will receive upon the death of the pensioner. 𝐴𝑧,𝑦 is the annuity price 
for the individual that will be used to compute pension wealth. In order to consider cases of 
single and married individuals, the parameter 𝜃 will be either 0% or 50%, respectively. The 
value of pension wealth is simply the product of the annuity price of the individual and the 
value of the yearly pension (equation 3). The pension wealth is computed for the reference 
person of the household and the spouse if she/he also receives a pension. Then, we sum up 
the pension wealth of both the reference person and spouse to obtain the measure of pension 
wealth at the level of the household. The results are reported in next tables and figures. 
 
Table 4. Distribution of household wealth by quartiles 
Country 
net worth   including public pension 
wealth   
including public & private 
pension wealth 
bottom 
25% 
next 
25% 
next 
25% 
top 
25%   
bottom 
25% 
next 
25% 
next 
25% 
top 
25%   
bottom 
25% 
next 
25% 
next 
25% 
top 
25% 
AT 0.01 0.06 0.18 0.76   0.07 0.14 0.23 0.57   0.06 0.13 0.21 0.60 
BE 0.03 0.11 0.21 0.65   0.07 0.16 0.24 0.53   0.07 0.15 0.24 0.53 
DE 0.00 0.05 0.20 0.75   0.07 0.14 0.24 0.55   0.07 0.14 0.24 0.55 
ES 0.03 0.12 0.21 0.64   0.05 0.13 0.24 0.58   0.05 0.13 0.24 0.58 
FI 0.02 0.13 0.25 0.60   0.05 0.14 0.25 0.56   0.08 0.16 0.26 0.50 
FR 0.01 0.09 0.21 0.69   0.07 0.14 0.24 0.55   0.07 0.14 0.24 0.55 
GR 0.03 0.14 0.24 0.59   0.09 0.17 0.25 0.49   0.09 0.17 0.25 0.49 
IT 0.02 0.11 0.21 0.66   0.07 0.14 0.24 0.55   0.07 0.14 0.23 0.55 
LU 0.04 0.12 0.18 0.66   0.07 0.14 0.23 0.56   0.07 0.14 0.24 0.55 
NL 0.01 0.09 0.27 0.63   0.09 0.16 0.27 0.48   0.09 0.17 0.26 0.49 
PT 0.01 0.08 0.18 0.73   0.06 0.12 0.20 0.62   0.06 0.12 0.20 0.62 
SI 0.04 0.12 0.33 0.51   0.07 0.14 0.25 0.54   0.07 0.15 0.25 0.52 
SK 0.08 0.16 0.25 0.50   0.13 0.20 0.26 0.41   0.13 0.19 0.26 0.41 
Source: first round of HFCS (circa 2010) and Life tables from 
Eurostat year 2010.             
The results show a sharp fall of wealth inequality when pension wealth is included in the 
measure of household wealth. Germany is the country that experiences the largest drop in 
the Gini index, which decreases from to 0.681 to 0.436, i.e. 0.245 points. Then, Austria, 
Netherlands and France report a decrease in the Gini index of about 0.19-0.21 points. Spain 
is the country that reports the most modest decrease in the Gini index, which decreases by 
0.073 points, from 0.554 to 0.481. Public pensions have a sizeable and clear equalization 
effect on the distribution of wealth. The effect of private pension wealth in the distribution of 
wealth is, in general, not very important after public pension wealth has been included, 
although Austria and Finland are exemptions. The Gini index of wealth in Austria falls from 
0.696 to 0.450 when public pension are added, but it increases to 0.485 when both public 
and private are included in the measure of household wealth. The opposite effect is found in 
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Finland where both public and private pension wealth reduces wealth inequality. In that 
country, the Gini index drops from 0.516 to 0.453 and to 0.379 after public and private pension 
wealth is included, respectively, in household wealth. One of the distinctive characteristics of 
the Finish pension system is the existence of a state pension for all citizens and a well-
developed system of compulsory occupational pension plans. A similar case is Netherlands, 
although the occupational pensions have a negligible effect on the distribution of household 
wealth. In other European countries, the pensions are mostly based on public schemes, while 
the market for occupational pensions is limited. 
 
Figure 9. Size and equalization power of pension wealth 
 
In line with what is indicated in Marx et al. (2015), that a low level of inequality in rich 
economies cannot be achieved with a low level of social spending, it is interesting to note in 
our results that countries that expend more in pensions are also able to reduce wealth 
inequality by larger values. In this respect, Figure 9 plots the difference between the Gini 
indexes of net worth and augmented wealth (last column of Table 3, which we call 
‘equalization power’) against the relative size of pension wealth, which is measured as the 
ratio of the means of total pension wealth over national net worth. The correlation between 
the equalization power of pensions and the size of pension wealth is large at r=0.70. 
Interestingly, the correlation becomes stronger (r=0.97) after removing Finland and 
Netherlands, which are the countries with the most developed systems of occupational 
pensions in our sample. 
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7. Inheritance 
In a recent study, Crawford and Hood (2016) find that inheritances and financial gifts have 
an equalizing effect on wealth distribution when standard measures of marketable wealth are 
used. However, these effects disappear when the authors employ augmented measures of 
wealth, which include estimates of state and private pension wealth. These results shows the 
importance of considering both pension wealth and bequests for a more comprehensive 
analysis of wealth distribution. Once marketable wealth is ‘augmented’ with pensions and 
bequests, one can be in a better position to evaluate lifetime income distribution, which may 
useful to derive some policy recommendations. 
The importance of bequests in the accumulation of wealth has been widely acknowledged, 
but there is no agreement whether they have equalizing or dis-equalizing effects on the 
distribution of wealth. Inheritances may reduce wealth inequality because they represent a 
larger share of the holdings of poorer households, but they can also significantly increase the 
wealth of individuals who are already wealthy and therefore increase inequality. Wolff and 
Gittleman (2014) report that about 20%-30% of household wealth in the U.S. stems from 
bequests and other forms of wealth transfers and find that inheritances have equalizing 
effects on wealth distribution. Boserup et al. (2016) use information from Danish wealth 
registers and find that bequests reduce top wealth shares. Inheritances can also reduce 
wealth inequality according to the simulations by Gokhale and Kotlikoff (2002) and Gokhale 
et al. (2001) but they have a limited role on the generation of wealth inequality, with earnings 
inequality being a much more important determinant of wealth inequality. In the same line, 
Hendricks (2007) points out the importance of accounting for the joint distribution of wealth 
and earnings in order to build a satisfactory theory of wealth inequality, and the survey by 
Benhabib and Bisin (2016) identify stochastic earnings as one of the key factors to generate 
wealth distributions (together with stochastic returns and exploding wealth accumulation). 
There is no consensus regarding the effects of bequest motives on the distribution of 
bequests and wealth, nor which motives are more prevalent. Indeed, Gale and Perosek 
(2001) and Cigno et al. (2011) suggest that households can have different motives or the 
importance of each motive differs across households. For example, it has been found that 
accidental bequests can increase wealth inequality (Gokhale and Kotlikoff 2002, Gokhale et 
al. 2011) and also reduce wealth inequality (Nishiyama 2002), or have little effect (Hugget 
1996), while intended bequests may increase wealth inequality (Cataneda et al. 2003, Laitner 
2002, De Nardi 2004). For Cremer and Pestieau (2011) only altruistic bequests contribute to 
social immobility, while accidental bequest have uncertain effects. 
We can exploit our data to examine the potential role of inheritance in the build up of the 
measures of net worth inequality that we reported earlier in this chapter. Our HFCS data 
contain information about inheritance elicited from the following question: “Have you/has any 
member of the household ever received an inheritance or a substantial gift, including money 
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or any other assets (from someone who is not part of your current household)?” For the three 
most significant transfers, we also know the amount received.7 We use this information to 
assess the total value of those transfers and inheritances. Similar information is available in 
the three LWS countries. 
 
Table 5: Inheritance and gifts. Share of households having received a gift or 
inheritance (top), average value of inheritance and gifts (middle), share of 
households expecting inheritance in the future 
 
 All pop-
ulation 
Bottom 20% of 
wealth 
Middle 20-90% 
of wealth 
Between top 
90% and top 
95% of wealth 
Top 5% of 
wealth 
 Share of households having received inheritance or substantial gift 
Germany 0.27 0.07 0.30 0.47 0.51 
Italy n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
Luxembourg 0.27 0.07 0.30 0.56 0.45 
Spain 0.24 0.10 0.24 0.44 0.59 
France 0.40 0.15 0.42 0.69 0.74 
Australia n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
United Kingdom 0.13 0.08 0.13 0.18 0.19 
United States 0.20 0.07 0.21 0.43 0.45 
 Average value of inheritance or gift received (in average annual income) 
Germany 0.7 0.0 0.4 2.2 5.9 
Italy n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
Luxembourg 0.6 0.0 0.5 2.5 2.5 
Spain 0.6 0.0 0.4 1.8 4.6 
France 0.9 0.1 0.7 2.6 6.1 
Australia n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
United Kingdom 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.4 
United States 0.5 0.0 0.3 1.4 4.3 
 Share of households expecting to receive inheritance ‘in the future’ 
Germany 0.13 0.07 0.15 0.12 0.13 
Italy n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
Luxembourg 0.20 0.13 0.22 0.26 0.25 
Spain n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
France n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
Australia n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
United Kingdom n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
United States 0.11 0.10 0.11 0.14 0.19 
 
7
 We also often know the year the transfer was received and could therefore make a valuation to current 
values by assuming, e.g., 2.5% percent constant annual return. Unfortunately  the prevalence of missing data 
on the year of the transfer makes this problematic. 
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The HFCS also asks whether the household's main residence has been inherited or received 
as a gift, and if so for what share. Because the valuation of such a transfer is problematic and 
because such information is not readily available in the LWS database, we ignore this source 
of transfer in-kind in our analysis.  
Table 5 displays the share of households that report having inherited and the estimated total 
value thereof for different levels of current net worth. The last panel of the table also report 
the share of households who expect to receive income in the future (although this information 
is only available for three countries). 
The share of households having received inheritance or a substantial gift goes from a low 
13% in the UK up to as high as 40% in France. For the other six countries with available data 
it is in the range of 20-27%. Variations are of similar magnitudes if we consider the mean 
value of those inheritances, from a low 0.1 year of average annual income in the UK up to 
0.9 year of annual income in France. These amounts are low compared to the average values 
of net worth from Table 1 – 1/60th of average net worth in the UK and 1/7th in France. But of 
course, these are valued at the time of the transfer whereas net worth is valued at current 
prices. Unfortunately missing information on the timing of the transfer limits the possibility to 
convert the nominal value of transfers to current values.  
However, an indirect indication that inheritance plays a significant role in building up of wealth 
is that the share of people receiving inheritance increases with the position of households in 
the distribution of net worth. The share of people having inherited among the 20% least wealth 
is much lower than average, from 7% to 18%. On the contrary the share of households having 
received some transfer among those in the top 5% of the net worth distribution ranges from 
45% (in the US or Luxembourg) to 74% in France (the UK is exceptional here with only 19%). 
The value of inheritance is also much higher among those in the top 5%. 
This gradient partly reflects an age effect as older households are more likely to have 
received inheritance in the past and to have accumulated wealth through own savings. 
Looking at the share of people who expect to receive inheritance nevertheless shows that 
households in the bottom 20% are also less likely to inherit in the future. In the US, those in 
the top 5% are also substantially more likely to inherit in the future. These numbers suggest 
that inheritance reinforces inequality in net worth, at least in the tails of the distribution and 
has implications for intergenerational transmission of inequality.  
We now use “Gini recentered influence function” (Gini-RIF) regression to substantiate this 
claim somewhat more directly; see Firpo et al 2007, 2009 or Choe and Van Kerm, 2014. In a 
nutshell, Gini-RIF regression is a two-stage procedure. First we calculate the “influence” on 
the net worth Gini coefficient of each household in our samples as a function of their net worth 
and of the distribution of net worth in their country – this is the influence function calculation 
(Hampel et al, 1986). Intuitively, households in the tails of the net worth distribution will tend 
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to have positive influence on inequality – all else equal, more of them will tend to increase 
the Gini coefficient – whereas households in the middle of the distribution will have negative 
influence – more of them will tend to reduce the Gini coefficient.  In a second stage, we 
regress households' Gini influence on the age of the household head and either a dummy for 
having received inheritance in the past (model 1) or the inverse hyperbolic sine transformation 
of the total value of the transfers (model 2). The transformation is similar to a log 
transformation with the key difference that it is defined over zero (and possibly negative) data. 
A positive coefficient on either of those variables suggests that inheritance increases 
inequality: that is, households who have received inheritance (or the amount thereof) tend to 
have net worth levels in the segments of the net worth distribution that have positive influence 
on the Gini coefficient.   
Because the receipt of inheritance is also largely determined by the age of households we 
add controls for the age of household heads in the regression and also ran separate Gini-RIF 
regressions 'locally' for different age levels using the age-reweighting described in Section 5. 
These local regressions thereby capture the influence of inheritance on the conditional within 
cohort Gini coefficients reported in Figure 7. Figure 10 shows the coefficient estimates on the 
inheritance dummy (model 1) in our Gini-RIF regressions along with estimates of their 
confidence intervals. The horizontal line gives the coefficient estimate for the overall 
regressions. Figure 11 shows coefficients on the transformation of the value of transfers 
received (model 2).  
All results consistently point to a positive contribution of inheritance towards net worth 
inequality. The coefficient estimates on the inheritance dummy is positive and significant in 
all countries at the overall population level. It is almost always positive and often significantly 
so within age groups too. So this indicates that households who have received inheritance 
tend to be more concentrated in areas of the net worth distribution that tend to increase 
inequality, that is, in the tails. This holds true even conditionally on age.  
There does not appear to be any systematic relationship between the impact of inheritance 
and age. Only in the US do we observe a positive age gradient in the impact of inheritance 
on inequality, from an exceptional negative value among younger households towards 
positive impacts for older households.  
These results are almost the same in model 2, in which we examine the value of inheritance, 
not just a dummy for receipt.  
Of course these exercises remain far from providing proper counterfactuals of what the net 
worth distribution would be, say, in the absence of inheritances. But the results suggest a 
positive impact of inheritance, unlike what other approaches have suggested (e.g., Wolff and 
Gittleman, 2014). All else equal, a marginal increase in inheritance would lead to higher Ginis 
of net worth.  
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Figure 10. Gini-RIF regression coefficients on inheritance dummy by age of household head (model 1) 
(a) Germany (b) Italy (c) Luxembourg (d) Spain 
 
 
  
(e) France (f) Australia (e) United Kingdom (f) United States 
 
 
  
Note: Estimates obtained by kernel smoothing. The horizontal line gives the population coefficients.. 
Source: Calculations from HFCS and LWS 
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Figure 11. Gini-RIF regression coefficients on inheritance value by age of household head (model 2) 
(a) Germany (b) Italy (c) Luxembourg (d) Spain 
 
 
  
(e) France (f) Australia (e) United Kingdom (f) United States 
 
 
  
Note: Estimates obtained by kernel smoothing. The horizontal line gives the population median. 
Source: Calculations from HFCS and LWS 
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8. Top incomes and wealth inequality 
The production of estimates for a wide range of countries of the share of total income going 
to the top of the income distribution by an international collaborative effort led by Atkinson 
and Piketty has played a major role in focusing attention on that part of the income distribution. 
The estimates brought together in the World Top Incomes Database show that dramatic 
changes have been seen over time (see especially Atkinson and Piketty eds., 2007 and 2010, 
and Atkinson, Piketty and Saez, 2011). Broadly speaking, a sharp decline in top income 
shares has been seen across the rich countries through much of the 20th century, with both 
world wars having a major impact. This reduction in top income shares continued up to 
around 1980, when it either flattened out or went into reverse depending on the country. The 
increase since 1980 has been substantial in the English-speaking rich countries, less so in 
the Nordic and Southern European countries, and very modest or non-existent in continental 
European countries such as France, Germany, the Netherlands and Switzerland.  
The linkages between these trends in top incomes and the distribution of household wealth 
has received some recent attention but many questions about this relationship remain open. 
While information on the changing role of income from capital over time is available only for 
a limited number of countries, for Canada, France, Sweden and the USA a sharp drop in the 
importance of income from capital was seen around the time of World War II, when a decline 
in the concentration of wealth was also seen. However, no clear uniform trend across these 
countries is seen for recent decades: in the USA the importance of capital incomes appears 
to have declined whereas in France and Sweden it increased and for Canada no clear trend 
is discerned (Roine and Waldenstrom, 2015). Whereas top incomes a century ago were 
dominated by income from capital and much of the decline in their share was associated with 
declines in income from that source, in recent decades the upturn in top income shares has 
been mainly due to increased earnings in the UK and the US, but with income from capital 
also contributing. Capital gains are important in this context but very difficult to trace, but 
realised capital gains do appear to have become more important in the USA and Sweden 
where they have been the subject of particular study (see for example Armour, Burkhauser 
and Larrimore, 2013, and Roine and Waldenstrom, 2012).   
The explanations advanced for the evolution of top income shares in recent decades have 
often focused strongly on skill-biased technical change and globalisation, changing executive 
compensation and ‘superstar’ effects, in contrast to the emphasis on wealth shocks and 
redistributive taxation in accounting for the decline in top shares over the previous 70 years. 
The interplay with wealth, and the role of taxation of income and wealth (including capital 
gains), clearly needs to be better understood. The difficulties in doing so arise in the first 
place from the nature of the data available: the data underlying the top incomes estimates 
are for the most part drawn from administrative data arising from income tax systems, which 
may not be readily aligned with data on incomes for the entire distribution from household 
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surveys, much less with data on wealth from similar household surveys or administrative 
sources. The World Top Income Database has recently been extended to go beyond income 
and include series on wealth-income ratios and the distribution of wealth, as well as the 
different forms of capital assets, and renamed the Wealth and Income Database (see 
http://www.wid.world/#Home). This will facilitate the analysis of long-term trends in both 
income and wealth distributions, but needs to be complemented by efforts to study these 
distributions jointly.     
The data sources we are employing here provide an interesting comparative window on this 
joint distribution of wealth and income, allowing the role of income from capital in the income 
distribution to be studied alongside the distribution of the assets giving rise to such income. 
What we can do is subject to the major limitation that the household surveys involved would 
not be expected to reliably capture the very top of the income distribution – the top 1% which 
has been the subject of so much attention. It is also limited in the sense that we are studying 
a cross-sectional picture and cannot capture dynamics over time directly. However, the 
analysis of up-to-date data for a set of rich countries covering both wealth and income can 
be illuminating, keeping in mind the points made earlier about the coverage and reliability of 
the data on wealth.  
Table 6: Net Wealth to income ratios by income category by country 
Income category Germany Spain France Italy Luxembourg Australia UK USA 
Bottom 20% 5.2 24.3 9.5 17.0 17.7 32.8 18.5 11.2 
Between 20-90% 4.2 9.2 5.6 7.5 8.0 6.4 6.1 4.7 
Between 90-95% 4.2 8.5 6.4 7.8 6.3 5.2 5.0 6.0 
95% or greater 5.6 8.8 8.5 9.4 10.2 7.3 5.4 9.2 
 
        
All 4.5 9.3 6.3 8.0 8.5 6.8 6.0 6.4 
        
We saw earlier the extent of cross-country variation when average net worth is expressed in 
terms of years of average household income: this went from a low of 4.5 years in Germany 
to between 6 and 7 years in France, Australia, the UK and the USA, about 8 years in Italy 
and Luxembourg, and as high as 9.3 in Spain. We look in Table 6 at how these ratios vary 
across the income distribution, with the mean net wealth of the households in different parts 
of the distribution expressed as a ratio of the mean annual income of that set of households. 
We see that in each country this ratio is higher for the bottom quintile and top 5% of the 
distribution than for households between the 20% and 95% percentile. The relatively high 
ratio for the bottom reflects the fact that mean net wealth is often as high or higher than for 
those between the 20% and 90% percentile, largely due to the value of own residences, and 
is being expressed as a ratio of the much lower mean incomes of the bottom quintile. 
Focusing on the top 5% of the income distribution, we see that Spain is distinctive in its 
relatively high wealth/income ratios across the rest of the distribution but not at the top. For 
the top 5%, Germany is still at the lower end with a net wealth/mean income ratio of about 
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5.5 for the top 5%, but so is the UK. Australia is next at 7.3, but Spain is now similar to France 
at about 8.5 while Italy, Luxembourg and the USA have ratios over 9. 
These wealth/income ratios must of course be interpreted in light of the underlying distribution 
of income and the varying extent across countries to which income is itself concentrated at 
the top. As Table 4 brings out, mean income for the top 5% is generally about 4 times the 
mean income across all households, with Italy and Australia having slightly lower figures and 
Luxembourg and the UK slightly higher; the USA is a striking outlier in that regard, however, 
with mean income of the top 5% being 6.7 times the overall mean. So if one expresses the 
mean net worth of the top 5% as a ratio of mean income across all households rather than 
mean income for that top group, the picture looks quite different. The mean net worth of the 
top 5% represents about 22 years of income for the average household in Germany or the 
UK, 27 years for Australia, about 35 years in Spain, France and Italy, 43 years in Luxembourg, 
and strikingly over 60 years in the USA.  
Table 7: Net Wealth to income and ratios 
top 5% by income Germany Spain France Italy Luxembourg Australia UK USA 
mean NW/top 5% 
mean income 
5.6 8.8 8.5 9.4 10.2 7.3 5.4 9.2 
mean income/ 
overall mean income 
4.0 4.1 3.9 3.7 4.2 3.8 4.3 6.7 
mean NW/overall 
mean income 
22.3 35.8 33.5 34.8 43.2 27.3 23.0 61.3 
The composition of the wealth held by those towards the top of the income distribution is 
distinctive, though rather less so than if one ranks households by wealth and examines top 
wealth-holders as we did earlier.  The value of the main residence generally accounts for only 
25-30% of total gross assets; the outliers in this respect are the UK at one extreme, where it 
comprises 40%, and the USA at the other where it is only 17% of the total. The USA is 
distinctive in the share made up of financial assets, which is over 40%, whereas in the other 
countries that figure is generally about 20-25% (except in Luxembourg where it is only about 
10%, with other real assets making up an exceptionally large share there).  Outstanding debt 
represents 10% or below of gross assets for the top 5% in most of the countries, including 
the USA, but in Australia and the UK that figure is closer to 15%.    
The extent to which the net wealth of the top 5% (by income) is reflected in their incomes 
merits examination. The income generated from these wealth holdings takes the form of 
interest and dividends earned from financial assets, together with rent on property. (Note that 
imputed rent for owner-occupied housing, which reflects the benefits from ownership of one’s 
principal residence, could also be included in principle but is not available in the data being 
used here). The top 5% receives a considerably higher proportion of its income in the form 
of interest and dividends than other households: as a percentage of mean gross household 
income, this varies from about 3% in Spain and Luxembourg up to 5% in Germany and Italy 
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and 8-9% in Australia, the UK and the USA. This is generally about twice the corresponding 
percentage for the households between the 90-95 percentiles, except in the UK where the 
latter group also receives about 8% of its income in this form. Rent accounts for a widely 
varying percentage of total income for the top 5% across these countries, and is not 
separately identified in the data we are using for the USA.   
Relating the flow of income from interest and dividends to the underlying stock of financial 
assets reported by these households, this flow represents 3-4% of the stock for most of the 
countries covered, but less than 2% in the case of the USA. As Table 8 shows, this ‘return’ is 
generally higher than the corresponding figures calculated for households between the 90-
95th percentiles, although the UK is an exception in that respect; the return for the latter 
income group is even lower in the USA than was the case for the top 5%.  
 
Table 8: Interest and dividends as % of financial assets by income category by 
country 
Income category Germany Spain France Italy Luxembourg Australia UK USA 
Between 90-95% 2.7 1.8 6.1 1.3 2.0 2.7 5.5 0.8 
95% or greater 3.8 3.1 8.4 1.7 2.6 3.6 4.4 1.7 
         
9. Conclusion 
This chapter draws on recently collected cross-nationally comparable survey data on 
household wealth to present international comparative evidence on the distribution of 
household net worth. Notably, this is one of the very first studies to exploit the new release 
of the Luxembourg Wealth Study database available since May 2016 from the LIS Cross-
National Data Center in Luxembourg and the opportunity to combine data from LWS and from 
the Household Finance and Consumption Survey.     
The countries examined differ in institutional settings such as public pension schemes and 
generosity, public provision of health insurance, or private costs of higher education which 
influence incentives for private wealth accumulation in order to finance future consumption, 
or as an insurance against future adverse shocks. They also differ in the tax treatment of 
assets and liabilities, such as for tax rebates on interest payments on mortgages, for taxes 
on the imputed rent of owner-occupied housing, for tax deductibility of private pension plans, 
as well as in terms of direct taxation of wealth or of bequests. The housing market is another 
source of heterogeneity across countries. One striking feature from examination of our data 
is however that, in spite of these differences, there is much similarity in many facets of the 
distribution of net worth across countries, at least from a high level perspective. The 
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composition and levels of assets and liabilities (when expressed in terms of average incomes) 
are generally similar, as is their distribution.  
There is often one exception however. Of all countries examined, the United States is the 
one that stands out in several respects. (One may always be suspicious that data quality is 
what makes the US net worth distribution look different, a potential ironic consequence of the 
high quality of the US data on wealth, in particular its capacity to cover the very rich more 
satisfactorily). Germany, with low values for real estate (and housing wealth) tends to have 
low levels of net worth and a quite unequal distribution thereof. Finally the similarity of the UK 
and France in many aspects that we examined is noteworthy and merits further investigation, 
given the differences in underlying economic structures and performance, in trends in income 
inequality, and in taxation of wealth and wealth transfers. 
The increasing availability of harmonized sources to measure household wealth is not only 
good news in facilitating comparative studies, but also in enhancing the capacity to elucidate 
the very concept of wealth. In this chapter, we have explored the consequences of extending 
the definition of net worth, by including pension wealth, for some measures of wealth 
inequality. The motivation to include pension wealth is that the present value of private and 
public pension streams are sizeable and may have important incentive effects on saving 
behaviour along the life-cycle. Our results show a much lower level of wealth inequality when 
pension wealth is included in net worth. There are also important differences in the equalizing 
effects of pensions across countries, but the exploratory analysis seems to confirm that 
countries spending more on pensions also reduce wealth inequality by more.  
Introducing pension wealth into net worth is just one of the avenues that it is important to 
pursue in extending the concept of household wealth. Other priorities include, for example, 
the correction of prices for housing assets, though these options need more detailed data 
that is not always at one’s disposal when comparative studies are carried-out. The estimation 
of public pension wealth in a comparative fashion can also shed some light on the implications 
of the so-called ‘hidden liability’ of unfunded public pension systems and motivate policy 
discussion by relating this to the power of public pensions to equalize wealth holdings in the 
society. 
Our analysis has also been able to cast some light on patterns of inheritance and their role 
in wealth accumulation, though this is once again a priority for further investigation. The share 
of households reporting receipt of an inheritance or substantial gift went from a low of 13% 
(in the UK) up to as high as 40% (in France), with similar variation in the mean value of those 
inheritances. The share of households having received some transfer, and the mean value 
of the transfer, was well above average for those in the top 5% of the net worth distribution. 
The frequency of missing information in the surveys on the timing of the receipt of the transfer 
constrains one’s ability to apply a rate of return and estimate the contribution transfers may 
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have made to the current stock of wealth, but this merits further analysis with some imputation 
approaches perhaps worth considering. 
Finally, the question of the relationship between wealth and top incomes, on which we also 
touched, is an extremely important one. We saw that for the top 5% of the income distribution, 
the net wealth/mean income ratio ranges from 5.5 (for Spain and the UK) up to over 9 for 
Italy, Luxembourg and the USA; the US figure relates to a mean income level that is itself 
exceptionally high relative to the overall average income, so the mean net worth of the top 
5% represents over 60 years of income for the average household there. We saw that the 
composition of the wealth held by those towards the top of the income distribution is 
distinctive, though rather less so than if one ranks households by wealth itself. The USA is 
distinctive in the share of the wealth of high-income households made up of financial assets, 
which is over 40%, whereas in the other countries that figure is generally about 20-25%. The 
top 5% receives a considerably higher proportion of its income in the form of interest and 
dividends than other households: as a percentage of mean gross household income, ranging 
from about 3% in Spain and Luxembourg up to 5% in Germany and Italy and 8-9% in Australia, 
the UK and the USA. This flow represents 3-4% of the underlying stock of financial assets 
reported by these households for most of the countries covered (although that figure is less 
than 2% in the case of the USA); this is generally higher than the corresponding ‘return’ even 
for households between the 90-95th percentiles. The dynamic interactions between 
increasing top income shares and the concentration of wealth and income from it towards the 
top is a critically-important topic for further analysis, with the joint analysis of data from 
household surveys and administrative/tax sources representing one fruitful strategy to 
employ.  
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